China's OBOR Initiative charts a path for trade and investment cooperation between
Introduction: Expropriation
A perennial concern of foreign investors is expropriation. It is whether the potential for the property rights in their investments would be taken by host State governments or otherwise substantially devalued by the effect of host State regulatory measures. Expropriation not only remains a principal challenge to foreign investment, but also is a well-established topic in international law. 1 A foreign investment may be expropriated either directly or indirectly. Direct expropriation is "usually open and deliberate, with the State engaging in outright seizure of foreign-owned facilities or mandating an obligatory transfer of title." 2 Conversely, indirect expropriation can occur in far more complex or obscure circumstances where foreign investors are unable to benefit from their investments even though their legal titles to their investments remains intact. 3 Direct expropriation was the focus of early examination during the post-colonialism era from the early 1960s. At that time, there were frequent nationalizations that were "intended to regain control of national economies from the companies of the erstwhile colonial powers." 4 Compensation for foreign investors was the central issue debated in the period from 1960 to 1990. 5 It is now rare for host States to adopt measures that obviously constitute direct expropriation. 6 Today, expropriation continues to occur indirectly. As a more common and disincentive to foreign investment than direct expropriation, 7 it has replaced direct expropriation 8 as a focal point on both theoretical and practical levels. 9 Martin Domke presciently foreshadowed this evolution of host State behavior in 1961:
Indirect expropriation generally involves "total or near-total deprivation of an investment but without a formal transfer of title or outright seizure." 12 In contrast with direct expropriation, the definition of indirect expropriation is unclear and its identification in individual factual circumstance is difficult. This is largely because the ostensible intention of the host State's activity is to regulate domestic matters in the ordinary course of legal reform and business management rather than to expropriate foreign investments. International investment agreements ("IIAs") and arbitral awards generally have been unable to articulate a clear and universally accepted definition of indirect expropriation or an approach to identify its occurrence and thus to distinguish it from non-compensable legitimate State regulatory measures. Host States and foreign investors remain uncertain regarding when indirect expropriation occurs. This dilemma inhibits the maximization of foreign investment and contributes to fracturing of international investment law.
The primary purpose of this research is to examine the emergence of China's One Belt One Road ("OBOR") strategy and the importance of enhancing clarity of indirect expropriation for its success. This paper is composed of five parts including an Introduction and a Conclusion. Part two will examine the OBOR and Regulating Indirect Expropriation. Part three will investigate indirect expropriation under the IIAs between China and OBOR States. Part four will refine the Regulation of Indirect Expropriation under the IIAs between China and the OBOR States.
The OBOR and Regulating Indirect Expropriation
The OBOR consists of both the "Silk Road Economic Belt" and the "21st-Century Maritime Silk Road" which were proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. 13 Such grand project combining land and sea has received high praise in and out of China as a milestone of the Xi Jinping doctrine. 14 16 These States have a combined population of approximately 4.6 billion, which is over 60 percent of the world population and one-third of the world GDP (USD 2.1 trillion). 17 China founded the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank ("AIIB") with start-up funds of USD 40 billion to support it. 18 In the implementation of the OBOR Initiative, foreign investment plays a vital role. 19 China's Ministry of Commerce provides that Chinese enterprises have invested USD 14.82 billion in 49 States along the OBOR, who have established 1752 enterprises and invested USD 6.49 billion in China in 2015. 20 From January to September 2016, China invested USD 11.12 billion in 51 OBOR States. 21 There are, however, three risks of indirect expropriation of foreign investments in the OBOR States. The first risk is due to the predominant type of foreign investment. As most OBOR States do not have highly advanced infrastructure, infrastructure construction investment is a priority area. 22 However, this type of investment projects normally involves high-level funding and takes a long time to be completed. Because these circumstances pose a high risk of indirect expropriation, foreign investors favor stable political environments and secure legal protections.
Second, political and social environments vary among the OBOR States. Some States have experienced rapid political changes, severely impacting Chinese investments and creating risks for future investments. The Chinese Myitsone dam project investment in Myanmar, totaling USD 3.6 billion, was suspended by Myanmar's President Thein Sein for the political transformation in 2011. 23 Similarly, in Sri Lanka, China's largest investment, totaling USD 1.4 billion for Colombo port, was initially halted by the new government in 2015. 24 Third, with regard to the legal protection against indirect expropriation, indirect expropriation has not been well defined or regulated as in most bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") or Free Trade Agreements ("FTAs"). It leaves host States and foreign investors exposed to legal unpredictability.
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Indirect Expropriation under the IIAs between China and OBOR States
China has signed BITs with 50 of the 64 OBOR States (Annex Table 1 ). All the BITs have either explicitly mentioned or implied the recognition of indirect expropriation (Annex Type A or Type B), with the exception of China-Bulgaria BIT that only refers to expropriation in general terms, 25 However, it remains possible to argue that the term 'expropriation' can be interpreted broadly to cover direct and indirect expropriation. China has signed three FTAs since 2000 with ASEAN, Pakistan and Singapore. (Annex Table 2 ) Each of these FTAs provides brief mention of indirect expropriation.
A. Definition of Indirect Expropriation in IIAs between China and the OBOR
States Two main approaches of defining indirect expropriation have been adopted in IIAs signed between China and the OBOR States. The first one takes direct expropriation as a benchmark and defines indirect expropriation in a general way. This approach is used in 48 BITs and all three FTAs. Common expressions used in referring to indirect expropriation include "measures having effect equivalent to expropriation" and "similar measures (to direct expropriation)." These terms are uncertain as to what extent certain measures would be recognized as 'similar' measures, or to what degree the effect on foreign investment would be considered as 'equivalent to' direct expropriation.
The second approach is to define and illustrate indirect expropriation with more specificity. However, this approach has so far been adopted only in two recent BITs with India in 2006 and Uzbekistan in 2011 (revised BIT). They include a general provision on expropriation by referring to one of the expressions listed in the first approach. Yet, they also include a detailed definition and explanation of direct and indirect expropriation either in the form of an attached annex or protocol, or in the same provision of expropriation. Article 5(1) of the China-India BIT first generally indicates indirect expropriation as "measures having effect equivalent to expropriation." Then, in the Protocol to the China-India BIT, Ad. This provides an effective response to the residual problem of the first approach by illustrating the 'effect' element in detail. In essence, the adverse impact needs to be 'substantial' on foreign investment and be able to make foreign investors 'incapable' of benefitting from their investment.
The revised China-Uzbekistan BIT is the only IIA among them (50 BITs and 3 FTAs) that incorporates the phrase 'indirect expropriation' into the expropriation provision. Article 6 (1) provides explicitly that indirect expropriation means "measures the effects of which would be equivalent to expropriation or nationalization." Unlike the China-India BIT, this provision does not include further explanation of this definition. Nevertheless, it provides guidance for identifying indirect expropriation that makes it stand out among all the IIAs signed between China and the OBOR States.
B. Identification of Indirect Expropriation under the IIAs between China and
the OBOR States
The 'Sole Effect' Doctrine
As has been shown in the previous part, most of the IIAs between China and the other OBOR States do not include detailed definitions of indirect expropriation, let alone any further instructions on the identification of indirect expropriation. This 'light touch' approach focuses on the 'effect' of host State measures as indirect expropriation; those measures must have an equivalent effect to direct expropriation. 26 This is not unique for these IIAs, however. The expropriation provisions in these IIAs normally followed or mirrored those in the IIAs signed by other large investor States before the emergence of the 2004 US Model BIT. 27 In practice, due to the lack of detailed guidance in IIAs, arbitral tribunals' interpretations became influential. Arbitral tribunals have enjoyed considerable discretion because of the vagueness of investment agreements. They have tended to take an investor-friendly approach to protect the interests of foreign investors. 28 The pattern of IIAs did not basically pay much attention to indirect expropriation but rather focus on protection to foreign investments. It might be due in part to 'neoliberalism' gradually permeated into international law on foreign investment when developed countries invested heavily in developing countries. 29 The idea of inflexible or absolute investment protection took root. 30 In practice, many arbitral tribunals 31 have invoked Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT") 32 when they interpreted the general and vague provisions of indirect expropriation. Article 31 provides that a treaty "shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose." 33 In terms of the 'ordinary meaning' requirement, as the reference to indirect expropriation in these IIAs mainly focuses on the 'effect' element, arbitral tribunals have thus followed this direction by recognizing it as the most important or decisive criterion in identifying indirect expropriation.
Preambles in early IIAs usually bear the idea of aiming to protect, promote and facilitate foreign investment. The preamble in the China-Cambodia BIT recognizes that "the reciprocal encouragement, promotion and protection of such investments will be conductive to stimulating business initiative of the investors" and aims to "create favorable conditions for investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party." 34 This treaty should thus be interpreted in favor of foreign investment protection. Combining the two interpretation requirements under the VCLT, it was reasonable for many arbitral tribunals to take the 'effect' of host States' measures on foreign investments as the primary and decisive factor to be considered in ascertaining indirect expropriation under those early IIAs. 35 Regulatory measures would be considered indirect expropriation that requires compensation provided the interference of the host State's measure caused severe adverse effect on the foreign investment. 36 This would be the case irrespective of any other circumstances such as the purpose of the host States or the public interest aiming to be pursued. This approach led to expansive identification of indirect expropriation. This prioritized private interests of foreign investors and placed less weight on the public interests of host States to regulate legitimate domestic matters. Professor Dolzer referred to this approach as the 'sole effect' approach, which implies an extremely investor-friendly standard. 37 
The 'Police Powers' Doctrine
The 'police-powers' doctrine articulates the principle that host States "have the right, indeed the duty, to regulate" 38 domestic affairs. It derives from the principle of State sovereignty. The Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States provides that a State "is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic disadvantage resulting from bona fide general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or other action that is commonly accepted as within the police power of States." 39 The 'police powers' doctrine was gradually incorporated into IIAs with the emergence of profoundly different global political and economic patterns. Recently, former capital-importing countries began to invest even in former capital-exporting countries, some of whom even became involved in indirect-expropriation-related cases as defendants rather than plaintiffs. 40 The 2008 global financial crisis led regulators in many parts of the world to revise their regulatory rights and responsibilities. The entrenched ideology of neoliberalism and the consequent principle of inflexible investment protection encountered objections from host States and non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"). NGOs argued that absolute investment protection is a substantial hindrance to public interests such as the protection of human rights and the environment. 41 Against this background, the identification of indirect expropriation evolved into a contraction phase. This is aptly described by one part of the arbitral award of
Feldman v Mexico:
The ways in which governmental authorities may force a company out of business, or significantly reduce the economic benefits of its business, are many. In the past, confiscatory taxation, denial of access to infrastructure or necessary raw materials, imposition of unreasonable regulatory regimes, among others, have been considered to be expropriatory actions. At the same time, governments must be free to act in the broader public interest through protection of the environment, new or modified tax regimes, the granting or withdrawal of government subsidies, reductions or increases in tariff levels, imposition of zoning restrictions and the like. Reasonable governmental regulation of this type cannot be achieved if any business that is adversely affected may seek compensation, and it is safe to say that customary international law recognizes this. doctrine. It provides that: "An action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred." 44 The economic impact of the government action can only serve as one of the elements that need to be considered in determining whether an action or series of actions by a host State would constitute indirect expropriation. According to Article 4(a), there are two other factors that need to be taken into consideration. They are "the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investmentbacked expectations" and "the character of the government action." However, the BIT does not present further illustration of these elements.
Another breakthrough embedded in the 2004 US Model BIT is that it provides some measures to differentiate indirect expropriation that requires compensation from legitimate State regulatory measures that do not require compensation. Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.
The 2006 China-India BIT 45 and the 2011 China-Uzbekistan BIT 46 absorbed the essence of the 2004 US Model BIT in solving the problems of identifying indirect expropriation and making a distinction between compensable indirect expropriation and non-compensable State regulatory measures. They have also addressed these problems in greater detail. First, they provide further interpretation to the elements listed in the 2004 US Model BIT. E.g., the China-Uzbekistan BIT limits the scope of the "investment-backed expectations" by requiring that "such expectation arises from the specific commitments made by one Contracting Party to the investors of the other Contracting Party." 47 As for the element of the character of the government action, both BITs also require consideration of whether host State measures were reasonably taken for public interest purposes. 48 Second, in addition to including the three elements listed in the 2004 US Model CWR BIT, both have added the element of considering the extent to which the host State's measures are discriminatory in scope or application over foreign investors and investments. 49 Third, the China-Uzbekistan BIT has applied a new approach in tackling the identification and distinction problems, the proportionality doctrine.
The 'Proportionality' Doctrine
The 'proportionality' doctrine resembles the 'police powers' doctrine inasmuch as they take both interests of foreign investors and host States into consideration in determining whether host State measures constitute indirect expropriation. The two doctrines differ in that the proportionality doctrine works further as a complementary standard to reassess and readjust each case at a final stage and aims to help arbitral tribunals to come to more rational conclusions. Except in rare circumstances, host State regulatory measures for non-discriminatory and legitimate public interests will not be recognized as indirect expropriation under the 'police powers' doctrine. However, such measures may constitute indirect expropriation if the proportionality doctrine is applied when the measures are disproportionate 50 to the aims that host States want to achieve. The 2011 China-Uzbekistan BIT is the only BIT that has adopted the proportionality doctrine among all the IIAs signed between China and the OBOR States. It requires consideration of whether host State measures are appropriate for the purpose of expropriation in identifying indirect expropriation. 51 Moreover, it delineates the "rare or exceptional circumstances" that would not be considered as exceptions to indirect expropriation. 52 According to Article 6(3) of the ChinaUzbekistan BIT, "the measures adopted severely surpassing the necessity of maintaining corresponding reasonable public welfare" will be considered as the foresaid exceptional circumstances. This is consistent with the proportionality doctrine that balances means and end 53 and demands host State measures to be necessary and appropriate to be justified as non-compensable State regulatory measures.
Refining the Regulation of Indirect Expropriation under the IIAs between China and the OBOR States
The unfolding OBOR initiatives open a window of opportunity for China to press for further reform and opening up and to participate actively as a dualrole party on the OBOR trade and investment arena. Chinese enterprises will contribute to more large-scale projects and make more investments in the OBOR States. China will also receive more investments from them. Advanced and upto-date legal protection should be sought as an inevitable move to guarantee the smooth implementation of the OBOR strategy. Foreign investment involves two conflicting interests: the private interests of foreign investors and the public interests of host States. This tension escalates in indirect expropriation, while it was not well regulated in most of IIAs between China and the OBOR States. This has led to legal uncertainty and unpredictability in foreign investment. Proposals are now suggested for refining the outdated regulation of indirect expropriation for the current and future IIAs between China and the OBOR States. The promotion and protection of foreign investment is no longer the sole priority in investment agreements. More attention is being paid to the protection of public interests in host States. This phenomenon can be explained from three perspectives. In terms of host States, first, protecting their legitimate regulatory right is vital at the domestic level and is indispensable to meet its international obligations 54 in pursuit of 'sustainable development.' The UNCTAD 2015 Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development 55 pointed out that "mobilizing investment and ensuring that it contributes to sustainable development is a priority for all countries" 56 and "new generation investment policies place inclusive growth and sustainable development at the heart of efforts to attract and benefit from investment." 57 In 2015, the UN Member States reached a 'groundbreaking agreement' of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda in the Third United Nations Financing for Development Conference. It provides "a foundation for implementing the global sustainable development agenda that world leaders are expected to adopt..." 58 The Agenda has explicitly addressed:
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The goal of protecting and encouraging investment should not affect our ability to pursue public policy objectives. We will endeavor to craft trade and investment agreements with appropriate safeguards so as not to constrain domestic policies and regulation in the public interest. 59 Second, foreign investors are advised to bear corporate social responsibility ("CSR"), 60 while investing in host States. When foreign investors operate business in host States, they become economic members of host States. Hence, they have responsibility to observe their legal obligations and minimize any harm on the environment, society and human rights and to make contributions to the general development of host States. 61 Moreover, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises pointed out that foreign investors "have the opportunity to implement best practice policies for sustainable development that seek to ensure coherence between social, economic and environmental objectives." 62 Supporting CSR could bring benefit to foreign investors by awarding them good reputation and making them disciplined and welcomed in the long term.
Third, with regards to foreign investments, it is worth noting that property is "a social institution that serves social functions." 63 Property rights cannot be absolute. They should be used in compliance with legitimate rules and for the sake of public interests.
Conclusion
This article has proposed revising suggestions to the regulation of indirect expropriation in IIAs in three aspects. First, as has been examined in the previous section, the preamble in each IIA plays a vital role in understanding and interpreting each provision because it sets up the general objective and ideology of each IIA. The existing foreign-investment-favored idea embedded in most IIAs should be updated to preserve host States' right and flexibility and to regulate for legitimate policy objectives, thereby achieving a balanced way to regulate as well as promoting foreign investments. States may also choose to include CSR clauses in the preambles to help develop a sustainable society. 64 Second, the simple and generic way of defining indirect expropriation in expropriation provisions under most IIAs should be amended. The author would recommend that, of the two main defining approaches examined, the second approach be more appropriate. This is because it provides a detailed definition of indirect expropriation by specifying the 'effect' of host State measures on foreign investments. In summary, three indispensable elements should be included in the definition of indirect expropriation: (1) indirect expropriation should be caused by measures or a series of measures that are attributed to a host State; 65 (2) indirect expropriation occurs without formal transfer of title or outright seizure of foreign investments; and (3) such State measures severely or substantially interfere with the investments of foreign investors, with an effect equivalent to direct expropriation. In this regard, investors are unable to use, enjoy or dispose of their investments.
Third, guidance should be provided of how to identify indirect expropriation in order to distinguish it from non-compensable State regulatory measures. Just two of the 53 IIAs signed between China and other OBOR States have included such guidance. The lacuna existing in the rest of the IIAs should be filled in at this juncture. Of the three main doctrines regarding indirect expropriation, it is argued that the balanced approach of 'police powers' or 'proportionality' should be adopted. The vital role of the 'effect' element is not questioned by any of the three doctrines. The 'police powers' doctrine and the 'proportionality' doctrine differ from the 'sole effect' doctrine in that they do not put the 'effect' element as the decisive factor. Rather, they place the 'effect' element into a broader framework requiring a balance with other elements. 
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